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AN ABSTRACT OF THE RESEARCH PAPER OF 
BABATUNDE AIYEMO, for the Master of Science degree in ECONOMICS, presented on 
December 11, 2012 at Southern Illinois University Carbondale. 
TITLE: REASSESSING THE IMPACT OF INFLATION TARGETING IN EMERGING 
MARKET ECONOMIES 
MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. Scott Gilbert 
In this paper, we subject a seeming consensus on the impact of inflation targeting in 
emerging market economies to some robustness assessments. First we report performance along 
carefully redefined country brackets, we find little evidence to support the notion that economies 
with inflation targeting policies performed better than non-targeting economies in terms of GDP 
growth, inflation and economic volatility. In fact, there is a suggestion in the results that amongst 
certain clusters of economies, certain restrictive aspects of the policy actually inhibit growth 
In a subsequent assessment, we control for extent of development using specific country 
proxies but equally observe, consistent with the above, that no evidence exists in the data of 
superior overall performances due to the practice of inflation targeting.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Today, the body of macroeconomics is in consensus about the primary aim of monetary 
policy being the stability of prices (see for instance, Batini, Nelson & Yates 2003; Pianalto, 
2005). To achieve this objective, the macroeconomic toolkit offers a number of potential 
anchors, viz; inflation targeting, exchange rate targeting, nominal money growth targeting or an 
eclectic framework with multiple objectives (Roger, 2010).  As Batini & Laxton (2006) and 
Jonas & Mishkin (2004) directly note however, inflation targeting stands out amongst all the 
above since it targets the price level directly, rather than intermediate variables.  On the surface, 
this seems quite intuitive and hence an effective policy option which should imply that it would 
be the natural anchor of choice. Indeed, a vast body of theoretical constructs widely endorses this 
monetary management option.  
However, just as strong and intellectual is the body of literature in opposition to this 
policy stance. Stiglitz (2008) for instance, has argued, amongst other things, that inflation should 
be considered more as a distortion signal from a wide-range of possible macroeconomic causal 
indices which requires a surgical rather than mechanical adjustment process; Frankel, on the 
other hand, notes poignantly that a proof of how flawed a philosophy of price anchorage is  lies 
in the fact that not all (not even the most severe) potential macroeconomic red flags are beamed 
through inflation signaling viz the asset pricing crises of 1929 and 2008 (Frankel, 2012).  
For how extremely polarized though equally compelling the arguments on both sides of 
the spectrum are, economists shifted to the empirical arena in search of a definitive evidence as 
to the efficacy or otherwise of inflation targeting, since surely, if models could not provide 
answers, figures should. Early work by Neumann & Von Hagen (2002) suggested inflation 
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targeting induces convergence amongst high inflation economies; the highly cited counter 
analysis of Ball and Sheridan (2005) however, showed that once mean reversion was controlled 
for, the results became insignificant. This result has been supported by Willard (2006), Walsh 
(2009), Lin & Ye (2007) and Miskin & Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), all utilizing variously re-
specified measuring models. A counter result was however produced by Levin, Natalucci & 
Pigler (2004) in an AR analysis which observed ‘core inflation’ and Vega & Winkelreid (2005) 
with a propensity score analysis. Again, in the 2010 edition of the IMF journal, Scott Roger 
speaks definitively of inflation targeting economies having overall better macroeconomic 
performances between the dividing lines of 1991-2000 and 2001-2009. Such extremity in 
difference of results from observing more or less the same macroeconomic indices clearly 
highlights the sensitivity of outcomes to the methods applied in analysis and controls erected. 
Without a consensus of opinion for the developed economies, analysts have sought to 
determine whether a more obvious impact could be observed as regards this policy in emerging 
market economies. Here, the results are less nuanced, although by no means uniform. The four 
pivotal empirical assessments in this substratum were carried out by Batini & Laxton (2007), 
Goncalves & Salles (2008), Lin & Ye (2009) and Brito & Brystedt (2010). All with the 
exception of Brito & Bystedt (2010) concluded that inflation targeting mattered for emerging 
market economies. Other studies which have corroborated this result are Vega & Winkelreid 
(2005), Walsh (2009), Mishkin & Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) and the quasi-empirical assessment of 
Scott Roger (2010). 
Accordingly, by a numbers vote, it would appear that the empirics of the matter favor the 
position that inflation targeting matters for controlling inflation and output volatility in emerging 
market economies. Indeed, this position speaks to a very basic level of intuitiveness as it is 
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highly plausible that for emerging market economies, where inflation and growth volatility are 
severe problems, policies aimed at price stability will bear prompt and tangible impact. Analysts 
have hence summarized that coupled with the Ball & Sheridan (2005) results, it would appear 
that whilst inflation targeting does not matter for developed economies, it does for developing 
economies. 
So finally, maybe some agreement is possible on the impact of inflation targeting, at least 
on the empirical sphere. But is this really the case? We claim here that the outcomes from the 
adoption of inflation targeting in emerging market economies are actually more nuanced than the 
implied consensus suggests. Indeed, all emerging market cum transition economies analyses of 
inflation targeting carried out to date have proceeded with an extreme assumption that 
developing economies are homogeneous entities; and this is accordingly being relayed in 
inaccurate conclusions. As we demonstrate, controlling for the level of development through the 
dual instruments of implied institutional depth and the enabling infrastructural underlay, virtually 
recasts what has hitherto been touted in the literature as gains due to a monetary policy tool as 
largely gains due to levels of institutional development. 
The rest of this research paper is organized as follows; chapter 2 briefly reviews relevant 
literature with an emphasis on the four prior identified major findings on inflation targeting in 
emerging market economies, chapter 3 develops an alternative measurement methodology which 
basically identifies and isolates heterogeneity in an impact assessment framework; and discusses 
the source of data used in the research, chapter 4 presents and interprets the results therefrom and 
chapter 5 concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
As has been briefly mooted in the introduction, the four pivotal analyses on the impact of 
inflation targeting in emerging market economies were carried out by Batini & Laxton (2007), 
Goncalves & Salles (2008), Lin & Ye (2009) and Brito and Bystedt (2010). Here, I review a 
theoretical background and briefly examine each of the empirical trajectories whilst creating a 
link with a broader literature on economic development and macroeconomic performance. 
An excellent background to the theoretical pros and cons of inflation targeting as a policy 
option is provided in Batini & Laxton (2007). To summarize, Proponents of the policy claim 
inflation targeting helps build credibility and anchors inflation expectations more rapidly and 
durably by effectively communicating a country’s policy objective whilst creating lower output 
costs of policy failure as compared to alternative monetary regimes such as rate pegs. Critics of 
the policy however claim that the targeting policy offers too little discretion and unnecessarily 
restrains growth in addition to unnecessarily jeopardizing the country’s exchange rate stability. 
Of course, theorizing can only go so far, and attention quickly shifted to the empirical evidence. 
For the impact assessment in emerging market economies, the following stand out; 
Ball & Sheridan (2005): The Ball & Sheridan analysis was aimed at assessing the 
impact of inflation targeting in major OECD economies, its inclusion in this section owes 
primarily to its pivotal impact on all subsequent literature relating to inflation targeting. The 
major contribution of this paper was in its highlight of the need to control for previous conditions 
in attempting to assess the impact of inflation targeting as a monetary policy option, since work 
preceding Ball & Sheridan made no such attempts and all accordingly reported significant 
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impacts. The findings of their paper suggested that inflation targeting had no impact on GDP 
volatility, Inflation volatility or interest rates volatility once mean reversion was controlled for.  
There have been few criticisms of the econometric specification adopted by Ball & 
Sheridan, Willard (2006) for instance cites the low-power implication of aggregating many years 
of data into two distinct time periods, he however goes on to verify Ball & Sheridan’s results 
using a panel specification. Bertrand et al (2004) further highlight the arbitrariness involved in 
the break-date specification of the counterfactuals where cross section data is used. Even though 
Ball & Sheridan indicate robustness to break-date change, the question of how significantly this 
impacts the results has remained a moot point. 
Batini & Laxton (2007): Batini & Laxton was the first paper of note to replicate the Ball 
and Sheridan methodology in emerging market economies. The paper reviewed inflation 
targeting in 42 emerging market economies, structured on 13 inflation targeting economies, 22 
counterfactuals selected from the JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index, and 7 others of 
like-classification. In aspiring at extracting the sample economies from a defined pool, Batini & 
Laxton attempted to pay a degree of care, albeit weakly, to the possibility of some sort of 
heterogeneity amongst emerging market economies in terms of the potential impact of policy 
anchors.  Their research found that inflation and output volatility were markedly lower in 
inflation targeting economies than non-targeting economies. 
A possibly closer-to-life measure of the structure of emerging market economies is 
captured by the FTSE Global Equity Index Series, which ranks world stock markets into 4 
distinct subcategories; Developed, Advanced Emerging, Secondary Emerging and Frontier. As 
this categorization is not inclusive of all economies which may be considered emerging markets, 
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we may subtly adduce to a fifth category which embraces all other emerging market economies 
not captured by the index. 
To be sure, a very significant aspect of the raging debate on the impact of inflation 
targeting in emerging markets has to do with the actual classification of what an emerging 
market really is. The World Bank utilizes three roughly intersecting circles to define the 
transition of nations, viz; developing economy, emerging market and advanced economy, and so 
while regular literature classifies an emerging market as a step above a developing economy, 
World Bank does not to overly categorize nations as falling into either camp distinctly. The 
terminology ‘transition economies’ is also widely used to create an intersection between 
developing economies and emerging market economies especially in eastern European countries 
where a tractable assessment of the movement of certain bloc of nations from central planner 
orientation to market orientation was undertaken. So that, the intersection between developing 
and emerging-market, though nuanced, is potentially a basket full of heterogeneous groups, as is 
the intersection between emerging market economies and developed economies. An example of 
nations caught within this classification divide include South Korea, Taiwan and Israel 
(classified as developed by World Bank, but emerging market nations by a number of other 
indices) and Argentina, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan (which are excluded from almost as many 
emerging market classifications as they are included in).  
Goncalves & Salles (2008): Possibly the most referenced study on inflation targeting in 
emerging market economies, Goncalves & Salles assessed the impact of inflation targeting in 13 
emerging market inflation targeting economies against a counterfactual bloc of 23 countries, they 
ran the standard differences-in-differences regression technique of Ball &Sheridan with inflation 
and GDP volatility as dependent variables, adequately controlling for initial conditions and 
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found a high level of significance for emerging market inflation targeting economies. Issues with 
this research work lie in the fact that the researchers make absolutely no mention of how their 
counterfactuals were selected. To see an approximation of the heterogeneity in developmental 
blocs which potentially plagues the Goncalves & Salles sample, table 1 classifies the countries in 
their sample according to FTSE’s September 2010 blocs1. Here it actually becomes apparent that 
the Goncalves & Salles analysis just might suffer from some sort of a bias since there seems to 
be a weak comparison of actual targeting economies against the counterfactuals used. Note 
closely that most of the inflation targeting countries on the table are classified as either fully 
developed or advanced economies whilst a significant quantum of their counterfactuals are not 
even listed in the FTSE index. Indeed, we will find that a more robust assessment of the impact 
of inflation targeting ought to properly account for the stage of development amongst the 
sampled groups. 
Beyond the apparent lack of control for heterogeneity, the Goncalves & Salles paper 
contains a number of factual errors as they wrongly indicate the regime change dates of Chile, 
and Peru as 1991 and 1994 respectively whereas data places the actual dates as 1999 and 2002. 
The paper further utilizes the loose regime change dates of Israel and Mexico, all of which 
served to create a counterfactual break-date of 1998, which was lower than the corrected break 
date of 2000. The impact of this date error though is trivial as we ran their specification with the 
corrected date to no marked difference in outcomes (results not reported). 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 More extensive details of the FTSE classifications are provided in the methodology. 
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TABLE 1: FTSE CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTRIES IN G & S RESEARCH 
DEVELOPED 
ADVANCED 
EMERGING 
SECONDARY 
EMERGING 
FRONTIER NOT CLASSIFIED 
Israel* Brazil* Chile* Argentina Costa Rica 
Korea* Hungary* China Bulgaria Dominican Republic 
 
Mexico* Colombia* Cote d'Ivoire Ecuador 
 
Poland* Czech Republic* Nigeria El Salvador 
 
South Africa* Egypt, Arab Rep. Tunisia Lebanon 
 
Taiwan India 
 
Panama 
  
Indonesia 
 
Singapore 
  
Malaysia 
 
Uruguay 
  
Morocco 
 
Venezuela 
  
Pakistan 
  
  
Peru* 
  
  
Philippines* 
  
  
Thailand* 
  
  
Turkey 
  
*indicates an inflation targeting country 
Lin & Ye (2009): Lin & Ye utilize a novel idea in an attempt at encasing a core of 
potential inflation-targeting economies by employing a propensity score matching technique to 
determine the average treatment effect of inflation. They follow a two-step procedure of first 
trimming down the 52-size sample inclusive of 13 inflation targeting economies and 39 non-
targeting economies. Of the non-targeting economies, they use a probit score with inflation, 
money growth and GDP growth as potential identifiers of counterfactuals who have the 
macroeconomic prerequisites but do not adopt inflation targeting, they then extract from this 
counter-factual group individuals who attain a certain threshold score based on the lowest score 
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of actual targeting economies, and compare performances. They attempt a further shed of 
heterogeneity by utilizing countries with at least the same GDP per capita and population size. 
The Lin & Ye analysis however does not say over what span the above GDP per capita 
averages are based, nor the countries which form the final-phase counterfactuals in their ultimate 
score assessment. Moreover, the research erroneously assumes that once an economy is 
classified as an inflation targeting economy, it is of like-status with every other emerging market 
inflation targeting economy hence the choice of a threshold score. This is however very far from 
the case. The FTSE Global Equity Index Series ranks two of the so-called emerging market 
inflation targeting economies on the Lin & Ye list as fully developed economies, i.e. at par with 
OECD economies  (Israel and Korea), five of them as advanced emerging economies (Brazil, 
Hungary, Mexico, Poland, South Africa), five as secondary emerging (Czech Republic, 
Colombia, Peru, Philippines, Thailand) and one of them does not even make it into any 
categorization (Chile); this provides a first hint of how diversely different the baseline basket is. 
Even if we were to presume that the propensity scores for the members of the three categorized 
groups were similar, (which is a far shot) if the propensity score had yielded anything for Chile 
in the neighborhood of the other twelve targeting economies, it should have cast instant doubts 
on the validity of the technique as being able to produce credible results. But then again, observe 
how the assumption of homogeneity amongst all developing economies would suggest that an 
acceptance threshold be dictated by the targeting country with the lowest score; hence distorted 
results. 
Brito & Bystedt (2010): Brito & Bystedt utilize extensive panel data techniques of 
system and difference GMM in analysis of the combined samples of Goncalves & Salles and 
Batini & Laxton. The subtext of the paper was a display of how a change of econometric 
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specification could yield different results. And the point was adequately made. The authors 
moved from low-ground OLS-panel data regressions to high-ground System GMM estimates 
where the measures of macroeconomic performance vis-à-vis the inflation targeting index swung 
from initially significant to ultimately insignificant.  
While their objective was adequately communicated however, the Brito & Bystedt 
analysis instantly inherited the weaknesses of the Goncalves & Salles research paper in failing to 
account for the diversity of its sampled elements. Indeed, much as they accounted for possible 
endogeneiety, the GMM technique is not optimized to identify heterogeneity; hence, even though 
the Brito & Bystedt analysis produces results that mirror the ultimate findings of this research 
work, its highway is faulty, and so the uptakes from its approach are questionable. Moreover, the 
authors accede in utilizing the System-GMM approach that it does badly with large sample sizes, 
and so they attempted to fit the data into the model by averaging their macroeconomic indices 
into bundles of 3 years with no explanation for their choice of time-frame; which motivates a 
valid questioning of what exactly it is that the resulting output communicates, especially given 
that the very essence of monetary policy is highly short-term driven via business cycle 
management, and its impact becomes less and less observable as data is aggregated over longer 
periods.  
Very plausibly also, the contrasting results of the Brito & Bystedt analysis may ultimately 
owe more to excessive data smoothing that it does to their econometric re-specifications since in 
addition to the above highlighted averaging, they control for hyperinflation by adopting a 
conversion mechanism for both GDP growth and inflation volatility which resulted in highly 
centered individual observations, which could naturally result in reduced sensitivity to inflation 
targeting-induced changes.  
11 
 
 
As a final point in this chapter, we underscore what we believe to have been the subtle 
factor at play in the papers reviewed thus far. Just as Ball & Sheridan observed that no cross-
country analysis on the impact of inflation targeting is complete without controlling for initial 
conditions, we submit that no cross-country analysis on emerging market economies can be 
credibly undertaken without controlling for individual institutional development. The reasoning 
is apparent; institutions are robust in macroeconomic performance. This is duly noted in the 
literature by papers such as Acemoglu etal (2001, 2002), Easterly & Levin (2003), Jones (1981), 
Bardhan (1984), North (1990), and Hall & Jones (1999). Some potent and highly enlightening 
conclusions relating to the role of institutions in macroeconomic performance have similarly 
been adduced; Acemoglu etal (2003) conclude that a strong and robust relationship subsists 
between historically determined components of institutions and volatility and once controlled 
for, macroeconomic policies have only minor impact on volatility and crises. This conclusion 
was re-echoed by Easterly & Levine (2003) utilizing a completely different methodological 
toolset. Hall & Jones (1998) trail a subtler path however, finding that institutions and 
government policy serve as perfect substitutes.  
Unlike a number of the above stated papers, we do not aspire to the knowledge of what 
influences the status of any country’s institutions; we do however aver, in league with the 
referenced literature, that they are relevant aspects of any economy’s performance and the 
commitment to improve them significantly impacts macroeconomic fundamentals; accordingly, 
we can only truly assess the impact of any policy, inflation targeting inclusive, in institutionally 
diverse entities such as emerging market nations, after controlling for such underlying interplay. 
  It is of note that no paper thus far has erected this layer of control in measuring the 
impact of inflation targeting on emerging market economies; and we can certainly reason out 
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how what looks like gains from inflation targeting can actually be gains attributed to institutional 
development. Again, this is fully plausible given that countries which have aspired to adopt this 
monetary regime have been required to erect certain institutional benchmarks prior to instituting 
inflation targeting. A careful observer will notice that one of the potential biases of previous 
studies creeps up here, since a category 1 sorting is initiated by the institutional requirements for 
adopting targeting. Not all emerging market economies can meet the platform requirements; so 
the roughest attempt at controlling for selection bias should at least only build into its sample 
pool countries which are capable of adopting the regime-i.e. an institutional threshold. So that 
one can posit validly that following the erection of these minimum institutional requirements, 
and the consequent macroeconomic impact, there was no further merit that the adoption of the 
inflation targeting policy engendered.  
Accordingly, in the subsequent chapters, we erect a structure which marries both the 
existing models of measuring inflation targeting’s impact in emerging markets with the 
underlying subtleties of institutional dynamics. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 METHODS 
In order to fully capture the specification implication of the issue of inflation targeting, 
we will utilize the same basic model adopted by the majority of previous research works dealing 
with measuring the impact of inflation targeting, which is the Ball & Sheridan (2005) model. 
The model itself has evolved. The earliest variant used by Neumann and Von Hagen 
(2002) initiated a specification of the type: 
Xi,post - Xi,pre = β1 +β2ITi + ԑi        (1) 
Where X is a two-state outcome prior to and after the administration of some treatment, 
each state subscripted as pre and post with the treatment in this case being an adoption of the 
inflation targeting policy. IT is a dummy which equals 1 if a country inflation targets and 0 
otherwise, and ԑ is a stochastic term which is assumed identical and independently distributed 
across observations. Ball & Sheridan modify this specification to account for the possibility of 
mean reversion by controlling for initial conditions viz:   
Xi,post - Xi,pre = β1 +β2ITi+ β3Xi,pre + ԑi      
 (2) 
The potency of this control shows up in the sense that it was the first empirical evidence 
that what had prior been touted as unambiguous gains due to inflation targeting were shown to be 
possibly no more than mean-reverting mirages.  
Batini & Laxton (2006) and Goncalves & Salles (2008) run the exact same specification 
for different samples of emerging market economies. Brito & Bystedt (2010) however, run a 
modified version, adjusting for the use of dynamic panel estimation techniques. 
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Our claim to a misspecification in the application of this model vis-à-vis heterogeneity 
motivates a re-specification. To fully capture the evolving consequence of this, we will proceed 
in two phases; first with a broad group reclassification, then with built-in cross sectional controls 
for social infrastructure. Model-wise, we start with re-specifying (2) as: 
Xi,post-Xi.pre = β1 + β2ITi + ∑  	 + ∑ 
 	 + β5Xi.pre + ԑi  (3) 
The above is a demarcation structure which aligns the emerging market economies 
sampled into four distinct categories. INS is itself a dummy which equals 1 if an economy falls 
into either of the groups classified as INS1, INS2 and INS3 and 0 otherwise; and whilst we 
actually observe four categories, in order to avoid the dummy variable trap, three demarcations 
are made and economies which are not subsumed into any of the three listed categories are 
automatically built into category 4.  
Our categorization follows the FTSE market classification of economies, excluding all 
nations listed as developed, with the exception of South Korea and Israel, both of which are 
included here since they are listed in all previous studies on inflation targeting as emerging 
markets. They are accordingly classified amongst the INS1 category of economies, which 
represents economies at the highest sub-echelon of inflation targeting. Other levels follow in 
similar ranking with INS3 representing the lowest sub-echelon demarcated; however since there 
are actually four categories, β1 and β2 will now capture representations for the unlisted INS4. 
Whilst the FTSE index is quite comprehensive, like all other indices, it is not a 
compendium of all economies in the world. It operates by thresholds, so that we can be fairly 
confident that all economies which meet a certain level of market sophistry and above are listed 
on its scaling platform. Economies which do not attain the minimum market threshold for listing 
are excluded from its platform; these are listed here as INS4 economies. Hence the INS4 bloc of 
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economies comprises countries which are not listed on the FTSE index but appear in either the 
S&P, Batini & Laxton or Goncalves & Salles papers. In all, 66 countries make up our sampling 
basket. The full list is presented in appendix II. 
There is need to emphasize what each of the coefficients will indicate in the re-specified 
model. In the Ball &Sheridan and Goncalves & Salles papers, the test of significance comes with 
the β2 coefficient in equation (2). The approach of each paper was to average X over a given 
number of years prior to adopting inflation targeting by the referenced economies, where X was 
either GDP growth volatility or inflation for a given period sequence. The X variable was then 
averaged over another period of years after the policy adoption and the differences were 
compared with nations which did not adopt inflation targeting via the specified equation (2). 
Since a pre-and-post period was required for the non-targeting economies, a break-date obtained 
by averaging the years for economies which actually targeted inflation was used for the non-
targeting economies, referred to in the literature as counterfactuals.  
When we re-specify (2) in the form of (3), these coefficients take on a slightly more 
specific meaning. β1 now signifies how similar the variations within the INS4 bloc economies 
which did not target inflation are, whilst β2 indicates how significantly different INS4 targeting 
economies are in the post-targeting era from non-targeting INS4 economies. Similarly, the β3i 
coefficient will signify how similar the variations within the non-targeting elements of the other 
sub-group of countries which did not target inflation are within themselves, whilst the interaction 
coefficients β4i will indicate how much better or worse-off the targeting economies in each 
subgroup are from their peers post-targeting. The test of significance of inflation targeting will 
now be deduced from the significance or otherwise of β2 and the interaction coefficients, β4i. 
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As earlier mentioned, equation (3) has been erected to capture dynamics within four 
institutional clusters in order to mitigate the effect of a sample bias in evaluating the impact of 
inflation targeting. This however does not imply that within each of these clusters heterogeneity 
is absent, so that a significance of either β2 or any of the β4i’s might yet be indicative of within-
cluster heterogeneity. So that even more potent for our results would be our ability to observe the 
impact of inflation targeting within a setting with less restriction still. Accordingly, at the second 
phase of analysis, we further reduce the four-bloc restriction and specify (4) as: 
∆Xi = β1 + β2ITi + β3′SIi + β4 Xi.pre + ԑi      (4) 
Model (4) incorporates heterogeneity into the structure with a finer comb by controlling 
for it with a measure of each country’s social infrastructure, SI. For this research work, we adopt 
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators to proxy for social infrastructure. The WGI 
dataset comprises a measure of governance in all economies along 6 specific watch-points, 
namely; 
1. Voice and Accountability (SI1) 
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence (SI2) 
3. Government Effectiveness (SI3) 
4. Regulatory Quality (SI4) 
5. Rule of Law (SI5) 
6. Control of Corruption (SI6) 
The individual indices are ranked from -2 to 2 for each country with -2 representing the 
lowest score and 2 representing the highest score. We find that the Government Effectiveness 
(SI3) index correlates between 70% and 93% with Political Stability (SI2), Regulatory Quality 
(SI4), Rule of Law (SI5) and Control of Corruption (SI6), which seems rather intuitive. 
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However, whilst it becomes imperative to avoid multicollinearity amongst the exogenous 
variables by proxying for the five high correlates with one of them, we run the risk of dropping a 
variable which might correlate highly enough with inflation targeting to create the impression 
that inflation targeting matters, while merely projecting the impact of the omitted variable. We 
address this by assessing combinations of each of the six variables with IT. Hence, β3 in equation 
(4) is an nx1 vector of selected controls for social infrastructure. 
Notice here that we no longer control for institutional blocs since these are instantly 
captured in levels by SI which approximates the average social infrastructure in each economy. 
In a manner of speaking, we have now created a structure which possesses 66 rather than 4 
institutional blocs.  
For each of the above models, in keeping with the standards of contemporary studies, we 
assess the impact of inflation targeting on four macroeconomic indicators, namely; annual 
inflation, annual GDP growth rate, inflation volatility, and GDP growth rate volatility. These are 
the measures so far observed in most previous literatures which have attempted to assess the 
impact of the inflation targeting policy on the economy. Our objective, as has earlier been noted, 
centers on building into specific existing models features that expound on causality, to this end, 
it is imperative that we are able to approximate results of previous studies as a necessary take-off 
point. 
3.2 DATA SOURCES 
GDP growth rates, Inflation data and the World Governance Indices are all obtained from 
the World Bank’s website. The countries utilized in this research work are a pooled combination 
of the Goncalves & Salles, Batini & Laxton, S&P Index and FTSE emerging market index. 
Accordingly, 66 countries are utilized. The details are provided in appendix II.  
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Dates of assumption of Inflation Targeting are taken from the Centre for Central Banking 
Handbook, No. 29, 2012 edited by Gill Hammond and published by the Bank of England. Data 
on the Institutional blocs utilized (INS) comes from the FTSE Global Equity Index Series 
Country Classification for September 2010, available on the FTSE website. 
The sample period is from 1979 to 2010. The choice of base year was occasioned by the 
need to retain a close-to-full basket on the occasions where we take first differences. The WGI 
dataset however, embraces observations from 1996 to 2010, with breaks in odd years less than 
2000. The database was itself initialized in 1996. By implication, we assume that the averaged 
social infrastructural layers from 1996 to 2010 on the average serve as a good proxy for each 
country’s average social infrastructure between 1980 and 2010. This however is a valid 
assumption, given that levels of institutions on the average exercise relatively stable relationships 
between countries through time (see for instance, Easterly & Levine 2003, Acemoglu et al 2001, 
2002). 
GDP growth and inflation data are used on an annual basis. We follow the structure of 
Goncalves & Salles in controlling for periods of hyper-inflation by sampling only within 
observations with inflation less than 50% basically because in re-running the equations to 
embrace periods inclusive of hyperinflation, whilst most of the qualitative results remain 
unchanged, the coefficients become truncated and unrepresentative of the average behavior we 
aspire to capture. The break-date, which is the demarcation period for counterfactuals, is 
computed in appendix III as 2002.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
All regression results are detailed in Appendix IV. 
To demonstrate the evolution of the potential significance or otherwise of inflation 
targeting in emerging markets, our regression results are presented first with the basic model, and 
then with progressive controls, detailed in the methodology, which are intended to isolate as 
much as possible the pure impact of inflation targeting on the volatility of macroeconomic 
performances.  
Significance here is evaluated using a t-ratio test of the significance of the coefficient of 
interest, the dummy variable, IT in the various patterns in which it is represented in each of 
models (2), (3), and (4). Specifically, we impose the null hypothesis; 
Ho : β2 = 0 
Which would imply that inflation targeting as a policy option bears no significance for 
macroeconomic volatility.  
Since we apriori are cognizant of how diverse the elements in our sample basket are, we 
naturally assume that the fixed standard error assumption of OLS may not hold, hence we control 
for potentially unstable standard errors by utilizing the White heteroskedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix for all regressions.  
Accordingly, we observe from table 1 of appendix IV that, as was rightly observed by 
Goncalves & Salles and Batini & Laxton, even after expanding the number of elements in their 
respective samples and increasing the years of observation, the reproduction of the Ball & 
Sheridan model for emerging markets indicates that the IT dummy bears a negative and 
significant sign in the regressions of inflation. Unlike Goncalves & Salles however, but 
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consistent with the findings of Batini & Laxton, the results for GDP growth rate volatility are not 
significant. We inquired into why this was so by re-running the regression with the specific 
Goncalves & Salles sample size; the results are presented in the starred column of table 1 and 
show that the IT dummy is now significant at 5%. This suggests again that the Goncalves & 
Salles sample pool is biased. Not surprisingly, the Batini & Laxton results conform to ours since 
they actually aspired to purge their sample of some measure of heterogeneity as has been 
indicated in the literature review. Once again, this highlights the sensitivity of the results to 
sample selection. 
The other results for GDP growth rate and inflation volatility additionally side with the 
findings of Batini & Laxton in indicting that the IT dummy is negative and significant at 5% on 
each occasion. For all the regressions, the coefficient of mean reversion is negative and 
significant, implying a strong level of persistence in each of the observed indices.  
Having established the base point, we present the results of Model (3) on table 2 of 
appendix IV, which observes the same regressions located within specific economic clusters. We 
note first that for all four indices measured, the non-targeting INS1 and INS4 clusters moved in 
completely reverse directions. One simple uptake from this is that very opposite results can be 
arrived at by simply weighting a sample to be either INS1 or INS4-heavy with proponents or 
counterfactuals. So that again we reiterate the role of a properly weighted sample in arriving at 
valid conclusions. When the results of table 2 are harmonized with table 1 of chapter 2, and table 
1 of appendix IV, the simple conclusion remains that a significant quantum of the results 
produced thus far in the analysis of inflation targeting in emerging market economies are not 
credible; they merely feed off the extensive heterogeneity therein.  
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Observed along each column, we get a hint of how the component blocs averagely 
tended, with and without targeting inflation, when appraised vis-à-vis each of the four variables 
under consideration. Below I briefly analyze the dynamics within each category. 
INS1 
Within this bloc, for both inflation targeting economies and counterfactuals, average 
values for all observed indices fell between periods; however the fall in GDP growth volatility 
was not significant for the counterfactuals, but was for targeting economies. Moreover, we 
observe that targeting economies recorded greater fall in GDP growth rates, higher inflation rates 
and no difference in inflation volatility when compared with their non-targeting peers. In order to 
properly read-off the implication of the positive coefficient on the IT dummy for inflation in 
INS1, note that it does not mean that inflation increased in countries that targeted inflation, it 
rather implies that compared to non-targeting economies in this cluster, average inflation was 
(significantly) higher by the coefficient of the targeting dummy; and since non-targeting 
economies recorded a 5.1% fall in inflation, the average inflation-targeting economy reduced 
inflation by (-5%) + (2%) = -3% on the average between both periods.  
The overall scorecard for inflation targeting here is not impressive; as, save for volatility 
of GDP growth rates, on the average, the results seem to suggest that they actually fared worse 
than non-targeting economies across the observed criteria and bracket. Keep a note however that 
in general, INS1 inflation targeting economies recorded lower inflation rates and inflation 
volatility between both periods observed.  
It suffices to expound on what the asymmetric decline in GDP growth rates within this 
group of economies suggests. We do not attribute the dissimilarity in this index between 
targeting and non-targeting economies to inflation targeting, rather, it suggests that targeting 
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economies within this bloc are of a higher level of economic development than non-targeting 
economies and the decline observed is suggestive of the effects of the theory of convergence 
which posits that more developed economies tend on the average to grow at a slower rate than 
less developed economies as they progress through time (see Barro & Sala-I-Martin, 1992). By 
implication, yet more heterogeneity likely exists within even this carefully selected group of 
economies.  
INS2 
In this bloc, but for GDP growth volatility which fell by 1.6%, there was no significant 
trajectory amongst non-targeting economies. Targeting economies however, fared better as they 
reduced average inflation and inflation volatility by 2.5% and 1.69% respectively. Save for the 
possible existence of further sub-categories, inflation targeting may be said to have achieved 
positive dividends for the management of inflation within this bloc of countries. 
INS3 
Within this cluster, two features distinctly stand out for inflation targeting economies. 
Observe that for the INS3 bloc, there is no significant trajectory in behavior amongst non-
targeting economies from any of the four observed indices; however, the targeting economies 
were significantly different from non-targeting economies in the near symmetric and 
simultaneous decline of GDP growth rates and volatility of inflation. In this cluster, GDP growth 
sank by all of 3% points amongst inflation targeting economies; we clearly cannot attribute this 
to convergence of any sort, since these economies are just a measure above the lowest sub-group. 
The only other thing that hints to what might be responsible for this is the fact that the volatility 
of their inflation was highly contained within the same bracket as well, and by a similar 
difference of 3% points. This is highly suggestive of restricted growth due to an excessively 
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contained monetary policy which had growth inhibiting consequences. Note again that the non-
targeting economies within this cluster actually fared better overall.  
INS4 
As was briefly mentioned in the analysis of INS1, this group of countries, which 
represents the lowest sub-echelon in our sample basket, observed higher indices on all measures. 
GDP growth rates, volatility of GDP growth rates, inflation, and volatility of inflation rates were 
all higher; moreover, the IT dummy was highly insignificant across all observations. Of note, 
amongst counterfactuals, each observation was not only positive, but significant. The 
convergence theory can be seen manifest in their GDP growth rates, and the lack of any 
sophistry in monetary management skills are suggested by the swinging volatility of GDP 
growth rates and inflation. It is therefore interesting that in the midst of this, where we have the 
clearest opportunity to view a distinction amongst inflation targeting economies, that no 
evidence exists of its efficacy. 
Now, coupling the above with the results for INS3, the position that developing 
economies ought to pay more focus to policies geared towards institution building is reinforced; 
since by and large, most macroeconomic impulses are merely reflective of this. Moreover, in 
being located within the lowest economic cluster, we can certainly reason out that the primal 
challenge for this group of countries should be less about monetary management, and more about 
developmental policies and fiscal discipline as indeed the data relays that whether or not social 
institutions are controlled for, a level of development exists beneath which the impotence of 
policy is unambiguously relayed. 
The results presented above ought to be read-off with a measure of care, since there 
might be more divergent behavior than has been captured in this rather static bloc analysis. Can 
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we, for instance, really attribute the fall in GDP within INS3 to targeting inflation? or indeed, 
can we confidently claim that INS1 targeting economies actually did fare worse than non-
targeting economies, and that this was unambiguously due to the adoption of inflation targeting? 
Is there somehow that we can adjust for the economic insecurities which probably prompted the 
embrace of this policy targeting in the first place, and can we isolate the effects of what could 
have been within these targeting countries from what eventually was? The slippery slope of 
falling off one cluster and into another whilst trying to make conclusive statements looms large, 
but in our final analysis we relax the cluster rigidity and fluidly control for what we believe is the 
actual delimiter behind the observed behavior thus far. 
Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 build social infrastructure into the model in graduated patterns so that 
the impact of inflation targeting can be reviewed in both uncontrolled and controlled phases. The 
most significant uptake from this analysis involves the uncontrolled-for influences on the 
volatility of macroeconomic indices which the practice of inflation targeting piggy-backs on. As 
we progressively erect controls, we show that the IT dummy systematically loses its valor.  
We start on table 3 with GDP growth rate as the dependent variable. With the full 
assortment of institutional controls in place in column 1, notice that the IT dummy is quite 
insignificant; this is because most of the possible channels through which its effect could be 
‘disguised’ have been controlled for. Further observe that for as long as a single SI control 
variable exists in the model, the IT dummy remains insignificant. When we exclude all SI 
controls however, we get model 2, and the IT dummy becomes significant at 5%. The simple 
implication of this is that cross-country analyses of the effects of inflation targeting on GDP 
growth-rates end up capturing certain social infrastructural interplays that correlate highly with 
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inflation targeting, which is partly why the IT dummy inadvertently captured the effects of 
convergence in the INS1 regressions. 
When we replace GDP growth rate with Inflation on table 4, in the selective controls of 
regressions 2-7, the IT dummy loses significance only twice, with SI3 (Government 
Effectiveness) and SI4 (Regulatory Quality). Not surprisingly, aspects of these are pre-defined as 
conditions required for the adoption of inflation targeting. In league with our argument therefore, 
the development of these institutions, and not inflation targeting, is responsible for the control of 
inflation. The proof of this lies in the fact that controlling for them pitches all countries with 
similar institutional depth together, and from the results evident, even non-targeting economies 
operate on parallel inflation levels.  
Table 5 offers a most interesting perspective to the discourse, here it is demonstrated that 
sometimes the relationship between the interplay of variables is not even linear. Observe that for 
all controls instituted, even with the full box of controls in column 1, when we observe inflation 
volatility as the dependent variable, the IT dummy is negative and highly significant across 
controls. Only when we update the model with the second moments of SI2, SI4 and SI5 on table 
6B does the dummy succumb. This relays how intricate the weave between institutions and 
policy can get. 
In our final set of regressions, table 6A repeats the process with GDP volatility as the 
dependent variable. Recall that in our replication of the Ball & Sheridan model, the IT dummy 
was insignificant for this category, and we had to compress our sample size to  the specific 
Goncalves & Salles band to observe significance. In like fashion, we used the Goncalves & 
Salles sample to observe the place of controls on the IT dummy. Not unexpectedly, it too 
oscillates between significance and insignificance, depending on the control erected. As a further 
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note of how poorly this sample is, we refer the reader back to our Ball & Sheridan reproduction 
of this equation on table 2. Notice closely that the DW statistic reads 0.97, which indicates high 
serial correlation amongst the error terms. This offers yet another element to our position on how 
poorly this sample performs overall. As the model is fitted with more controls and the DW 
improves, the IT dummy loses significance. 
We have paid little attention to the actual significance of the SI variables themselves, 
however a casual glance through the regression results will indicate that whilst some appear to 
matter more than others, and it is difficult to ascribe a single one exclusively to the workings of 
inflation targeting, they apparently all do matter for the control of macroeconomic volatility; 
accordingly, we are cautious about exclusively promoting one over the other since the channels 
through which each affects volatility may not be entirely apparent. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
Using the standard bulwark of the inflation targeting assessment in contemporary 
literature, the differences-in-differences methodology, we demonstrated alongside four standard 
macroeconomic volatility measures, that indeed, inflation targeting bears little evidence of 
success in emerging market economies. This was established with the alternate controls of a 
relocation of the sampled elements within approximate institutional clusters and the erection of 
infrastructural proxies. 
We further established two leading causes of the misrepresented impact of inflation 
targeting in emerging markets as being non-representative sample selection and the failure to 
control for institutional aggregates. Indeed, it appears that more often than not, inflation targeting 
inadvertently captures the implication of highly correlated macroeconomic dynamics which are 
not controlled for. 
Further examination of specifically channeled institutional emphasis as well as a possible 
role for policy in medium to longer run anchorage of macroeconomic aggregates, which are not 
observed here are left for future research. 
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APPENDIX I 
 SUMMARY STATISTICS & COVARIANCE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
A; SUMMARY STATISTICS
SI1 SI2 SI3 SI4 SI5 SI6
 Mean -6.31E-05 -0.17921 0.145593 0.222071 -0.00033 -0.03272
 Maximum 1.199167 1.325 2.140833 1.9225 1.5525 2.250833
 Minimum -1.526667 -1.88583 -1.0175 -0.98083 -1.30083 -1.10917
 Std. Dev. 0.719132 0.856716 0.650168 0.650193 0.719923 0.700449
 Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66
inflation inflation GDP GDP Inflation Inflation GDP GDP
srd. Dev pre.srd. Dev post.SGPRE SGPOST pre post pre post
 Mean 6.663369 3.077873 4.1913 2.934568 10.86921 5.985921 3.988184 4.628361
 Maximum 16.81132 16.1435 17.38754 9.146276 32.41836 27.6342 14.37963 13.55178
 Minimum 0 0 0 0 -0.817 1.050333 -4.812571 -1.273
 Std. Dev. 4.422067 2.332594 2.937868 1.964576 7.992509 4.147443 3.54475 2.089924
 Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
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B: COVARIANCE ANALYSIS
 
B; COVARIANCE ANALYSIS
Covariance
Correlation SI1 SI2 SI3 SI4 SI5 SI6 SIPRE SIPOST SGPRE SGPOST IPRE4 IPOST2 GPRE4 GPOST2 
SI1 0.509315
1
SI2 0.328876 0.722842
0.542022 1
SI3 0.265138 0.396951 0.416314
0.575796 0.72361 1
SI4 0.313127 0.396922 0.386584 0.416346
0.679987 0.723529 0.928554 1
SI5 0.302057 0.468276 0.429455 0.408656 0.510436
0.592412 0.770921 0.931615 0.886463 1
SI6 0.270123 0.440744 0.415918 0.395921 0.460673 0.483195
0.54451 0.745768 0.927334 0.882714 0.927601 1
INFLATION 0.637638 -0.36124 -0.60383 -0.15537 -0.55851 -0.52622 19.2584
SRD. DEV PRE 0.203597 -0.09682 -0.21325 -0.05487 -0.17814 -0.1725 1
INFLATION -0.248063 -0.00926 -0.35183 -0.34231 -0.28934 -0.29097 2.372741 5.358556
SRD. DEV PRE -0.150156 -0.00471 -0.23556 -0.22917 -0.17495 -0.18083 0.23357 1
GDP -0.010302 0.335641 -0.02252 0.075895 0.058045 0.010944 -1.079596 0.365461 8.500293
SRD. DEV PRE -0.004951 0.135405 -0.01197 0.040343 0.027866 0.0054 -0.084379 0.05415 1
GDP SRD DEV 0.247799 0.505351 0.130521 0.214333 0.156346 0.183316 1.450828 1.019151 2.884778 3.801082
POST 0.178096 0.304872 0.103757 0.170376 0.112244 0.135265 0.169571 0.225819 0.507507 1
INFLATION 0.897324 -1.4561 -1.30614 -0.77768 -1.29762 -1.2055 26.52594 1.471738 -5.98349 -1.07076 62.91232
PRE 0.158521 -0.21593 -0.25522 -0.15195 -0.22899 -0.21865 0.762066 0.080157 -0.25874 -0.06924 1
INFLATION -0.552338 -0.96989 -1.26066 -1.33993 -1.28349 -1.12509 1.761591 3.067415 -0.83448 2.386098 7.406609 16.94066
POST -0.188038 -0.27716 -0.4747 -0.50453 -0.43647 -0.39324 0.097528 0.321946 -0.06954 0.297351 0.226875 1
GDP -0.023298 0.345224 0.571019 0.29102 0.771829 0.55967 -2.961553 -0.267906 -0.94851 -1.90713 -6.441481 -2.331893 12.37487
PRE -0.00928 0.115427 0.251576 0.128211 0.3071 0.228876 -0.19184 -0.032899 -0.09248 -0.27807 -0.230859 -0.161055 1
GPOST2 -0.562278 -0.05604 -0.06991 -0.22451 -0.00432 -0.03726 -1.430092 1.599434 -0.01542 0.289011 -3.317335 0.435657 2.856352 4.301603
GDP POST -0.379877 -0.03178 -0.05224 -0.16776 -0.00291 -0.02585 -0.157123 0.33314 -0.00255 0.071474 -0.201654 0.051035 0.391495 1
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C: FTSE SEPTEMBER 2010 CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTRIES USED 
DEVELOPED ADVANCED SECONDARY FRONTIER NOT CLASSIFIED 
Israel Brazil Chile Argentina Algeria 
Korea Hungary China Bahrain Armenia 
 Mexico Colombia Bangladesh Costa Rica 
 Poland Czech Republic Botswana Dominican Republic 
 South Africa Egypt Bulgaria Ecuador 
 Taiwan India Cote d'Ivoire El Salvador 
  Indonesia Croatia Ghana 
  Malaysia Cyprus Guatemala 
  Morocco Estonia Kuwait 
  Pakistan Jordan Latvia 
  Peru Kenya Lebanon 
  Philippines Lithuania Panama 
  Russian  Macedonia, FYR Singapore 
  Thailand Malta Tanzania 
  Turkey Mauritius Ukraine 
  UAE Nigeria Uruguay 
   Oman Venezuela 
   Qatar  
   Romania  
   Serbia  
   Slovak Republic  
   Slovenia  
   Sri Lanka  
   Tunisia  
   Vietnam  
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APPENDIX II 
 ALL COUNTRIES USED IN THIS RESEARCH WORK 
 
APPENDIX II: ALL COUNTRIES USED IN THIS RESEARCH WORK
S/N CONSOLIDATED S&P +  FTSE TARGETING GONCALVES & SALLES S/N CONSOLIDATED S&P +  FTSE TARGETING GONCALVES & SALLES
ECONOMIES NON-TARGETING COUNTRIES ECONOMIES NON-TARGETING COUNTRIES
1 algeria 34 malaysia malaysia malaysia
2 argentina argentina argentina 35 malta malta
3 Armenia Armenia 36 mauritius mauritius
4 bahrain bahrain 37 mexico mexico Mexico
5 bangladesh bangladesh 38 morocco morocco morocco
6 botswana botswana 39 nigeria nigeria nigeria
7 brazil brazil Brazil 40 oman oman
8 bulgaria bulgaria bulgaria 41 pakistan pakistan pakistan
9 chile chile Chile 42 panama panama
10 china china china 43 peru peru Peru
11 costa rica costa rica 44 philippines philippines Philippines
12 colombia colombia Colombia 45 poland poland Poland
13 cote d ivoire cote d ivoire cote d ivoire 46 qatar qatar
14 croatia croatia 47 romania romania Romania
15 cyprus cyprus 48 russia russia
16 czech republic czech republic Czech 49 Serbia Serbia Serbia
17 dominican republic dominican republic 50 singapore singapore
18 ecuador ecuador 51 slovakia slovakia
19 el savador el savador 52 slovenia slovenia
20 egypt egypt egypt 53 south africa south africa South Africa
21 estonia estonia 54 south korea south korea
22 ghana Ghana 55 sri lanka sri lanka
23 guatemala Guatemala 56 tanzania
24 hungary hungary Hungary 57 thailand thailand Thailand
25 india india india 58 tunisia tunisia tunisia
26 indonesia indonesia Indonesia indonesia 59 turkey turkey Turkey turkey
27 jordan jordan 60 taiwan taiwan taiwan
28 kenya kenya 61 uae uae
29 kuwait kuwait 62 uruguay uruguay
30 latvia latvia 63 Ukraine
31 lebanon lebanon 64 venezuela venezuela
32 lithuania lithuania 65 vietnam vietnam
33 macedonia macedonia 66 Israel Israel Israel Israel
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TARGETING COUNTRIES AND DATES OF ADOPTION BY PREVIOUS STUDIES & BANK OF ENGLAND
S/N COUNTRY GONCALVES & SALLES BATINI & LAXTON
LOOSE STRICT
1 Armenia Jan-06 2006
2 Brazil Jun-99 1999 1999 1999 1999
3 Chile Sep-99 1991 1999 2000 2000
4 Colombia Oct-99 2000 1999 2000 2000
5 Czech Dec-97 1998 1998 1998 1998
6 Ghana 2002 May-07 2007
7 Guatemala 2005 2005
8 Hungary Jun-01 2001 2001 2001 2001
9 Indonesia Jul-05 2006
10 Israel 1992 Jun-97 1992 1997 1997 1997
11 Mexico 2001 1999 2002 2001 2001
12 Peru Jan-02 1994 2002 2002 2002
13 Philippines Jan-02 2002 2002 2002 2002
14 Poland 1998 1999 1999 1998 1998
15 Romania Aug-05 2006
16 Serbia Sep-06 Jan-09 2009
17 South Africa Feb-00 2000 2000 2000 2000
18 South Korea Apr-98 1998 1998 1998 1998
19 Thailand May-00 2000 2000 2000 2000
20 Turkey Jan-06 2006
BREAK DATES 1998 1999Q4 1999.692 2002.05
DATE OF ADOPTION BANK OF ENGLAND
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APPENDIX IV 
 REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
 
TABLE 1: THE BALL & SHERIDAN (MODEL (2))
VARIABLE GDP GROWTH RATE INFLATION GDP GROWTH RATE GDP GROWTH RATE INFLATION
VOLATILITY VOLATILITY** VOLATILITY
CONSTANT 4.09101 4.854682 2.328455 2.988548 2.539335
std. error 0.408227 1.202704 0.591725 0.611179 0.49189
prob 0 0.0001 0.0002 0 0
IT -0.980693 -1.505842 -0.689766 -1.163465 -1.492829
std. error 0.442197 0.729464 0.503067 0.557644 0.52785
prob 0.0302 0.0431 0.1752 0.0447 0.0063
INITIAL CONDITIONS -0.790749 -0.85394 -0.781502 -0.943861 -0.85129
std. error 0.076428 0.073967 0.096473 0.053092 0.090889
prob 0 0 0 0 0
R-Squared 0.69 0.76 0.645981 0.798 0.768106
DW 1.85 1.76 2.053581 0.97 1.755643
F-Stat 68.75 99.49 57.47817 65.09 104.3379
Observations 66 66 66 36 66
white heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
**Estimated using Goncalves & Salles Sample
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v er 
TABLE 2: IT & INSTITUTIONAL HETEROGENIETY (MODEL (3))
VARIABLE GDP GROWTH INFLATION GDP GROWTH INFLATION 
 VOLATILITY VOLATILITY
CONSTANT 4.248022 5.802837 3.116769 2.781571
std. error 0.38006 2.998463 0.982002 0.662518
prob 0 0.0579 0.0024 0.0001
IT4 DUMMY 0.116654 1.287403 -0.349281 -0.641176
std. error 0.817627 2.558178 1.241089 1.081761
prob 0.8871 0.6167 0.7794 0.5557
INS1 -0.901643 -5.185209 -0.066262 -2.118443
std. error 0.384582 2.670033 0.82495 0.80393
prob 0.0226 0.0571 0.9363 0.0108
INS2 0.588521 -0.290735 -1.583963 -0.100055
std. error 0.55926 2.488818 0.842854 1.10445
prob 0.2971 0.9074 0.0653 0.9281
INS3 -0.247976 -1.176384 -0.788284 -0.403991
std. error 0.649481 2.414055 0.864942 0.948055
prob 0.704 0.6279 0.3659 0.6716
IT*INS1 -0.738926 2.315978 -1.51778 0.381287
std. error 0.352395 1.354474 0.184612 0.463325
prob 0.0405 0.0927 0 0.414
IT*INS2 -1.007832 -2.511082 -0.041125 -1.688562
std. error 0.621296 1.476303 0.563449 0.900716
prob 0.1103 0.0944 0.9421 0.066
IT*INS3 -3.067788 -0.876457 -0.962419 -3.040927
std. error 1.698151 2.009531 1.527377 0.774017
prob 0.0761 0.6644 0.5311 0.0002
INITIAL CONDITIONS -0.81719 -0.875386 -0.802205 -0.847541
std. error 0.068979 0.104042 0.107037 0.089512
prob 0 0 0 0
R-Squared 0.719424 0.78 0.673357 0.78
DW 1.67 1.792484 2.26 1.770531
F-Stat 1.59 24.80 14.69 25.14
Observations 66 66
white heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
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TABLE 3; (MODEL (4)) DEPENDENT VARIABLE - GDP GROWTH RATE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CONSTANT 4.219304 3.960928 3.995241 3.972438 3.932558 4.052179 4.025373
std. error 0.608459 0.382406 0.395116 0.385173 0.372386 0.423624 0.432353
prob 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT DUMMY -0.35682 -0.628636 -0.443609 -0.620666 -0.637337 -0.555989 -0.58604
std. error 0.518462 0.432872 0.440391 0.435046 0.442928 0.416741 0.423435
prob 0.4941 0.1515 0.3178 0.1588 0.1553 0.1871 0.1714
SI1 -1.23279 -1.004764 -1.26408 -1.186393 -1.161685 -1.296094 -1.209601
std. error 0.510347 0.317279 0.540035 0.476734 0.480088 0.534322 0.526791
prob 0.0189 0.0024 0.0225 0.0156 0.0185 0.0183 0.0251
SI2 0.241706 0.36039
std. error 0.418554 0.474032
prob 0.5659 0.45
SI3 -0.07934 0.345308
std. error 1.062887 0.503887
prob 0.9408 0.4958
SI4 -0.68861 0.256766
std. error 1.401562 0.463252
prob 0.6251 0.5814
SI5 0.733752 0.471623
std. error 0.88426 0.549363
prob 0.4101 0.394
SI6 0.115613 0.373391
std. error 1.047429 0.548985
prob 0.9125 0.499
INITIAL GDP -0.81723 -0.784898 -0.791371 -0.800998 -0.791423 -0.813264 -0.801234
std. error 0.07871 0.061222 0.063863 0.067722 0.062851 0.072588 0.070895
prob 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
R-Squared 0.739777 0.730363 0.735677 0.73309 0.731663 0.735979 0.734318
DW 1.804539 1.8 1.822568 1.806174 1.845816 1.820896 1.826053
F-Stat 20.25536 55.97969 42.44464 41.88534 41.58146 42.51049 42.14935
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
white heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
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TABLE 4; (MODEL (4)): DEPENDENT VARIABLE - INFLATION 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CONSTANT 6.928915 4.634536 4.865379 6.063263 6.461971 5.512309 5.192301
std. error 1.760428 1.137647 1.282511 1.64 1.62 1.462593 1.335912
prob 0.0002 0.0001 0.00 0.0005 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003
IT DUMMY -0.1876 -1.15 -1.56 -0.923 -0.638 -1.378855 -1.219297
std. error 0.799142 0.68 0.861 0.67 0.65 0.73396 0.709665
prob 0.8152 0.096 0.08 0.17 0.3279 0.0651 0.0908
SI1 1.509148 -1.196084 -0.437339 0.586879 1.438653 0.53 0.011319
std. error 1.135228 0.561545 0.762441 0.85 1.07 0.94 0.726658
prob 0.189 0.0371 0.57 0.4928 0.1845 0.58 0.9876
SI2 0.709316 -1.013234
std. error 0.636401 0.967967
prob 0.2697 0.30
SI3 -0.403901 -3.164995
std. error 1.878131 1.59
prob 0.8305 0.0509
SI4 -5.626682 -4.123276
std. error 2.122757 1.78
prob 0.0104 0.0236
SI5 -1.628947 -2.628925
std. error 2.045925 1.493979
prob 0.4292 0.0835
SI6 2.84074 -2.07
std. error 1.962055 1.18
prob 0.1531 0.08
INITIAL INFLATION -0.940954 -0.843495 -0.87016 -0.938989 -0.941751 -0.941751 -0.899233
std. error 0.105047 0.071406 0.089014 0.104494 0.096671 0.10 0.09393
prob 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 0
R-Squared 0.830036 0.77009 0.776622 0.804904 0.82032 0.799352 0.78951
DW 2.070139 1.810296 1.68 1.74777 1.825274 1.729186 1.664392
F-Stat 34.79561 69.22355 53.01992 62.91667 69.62333 60.75356 57.20016
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66
white heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
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TABLE 5; (MODEL (4)): DEPENDENT VARIABLE - INFLATION VOLATILITY
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CONSTANT 2.766967 2.400753 2.539096 2.731478 2.684665 2.620181 2.600261
std. error 0.477869 0.462194 0.497737 0.492218 0.497527 0.493884 0.493584
prob 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT DUMMY -0.904412 -1.343269 -1.510743 -1.404438 -1.349419 -1.481586 -1.46545
std. error 0.52776 0.513569 0.535362 0.50042 0.491449 0.520234 0.515436
prob 0.092 0.0112 0.0064 0.0067 0.0079 0.006 0.006
SI1 -0.369424 -0.49975
std. error 0.452134 0.294151
prob 0.4173 0.0943
SI2 0.754306 -0.066909
std. error 0.553136 0.258007
prob 0.178 0.7962
SI3 -0.498314 -0.589156
std. error 1.300643 0.345833
prob 0.703 0.0935
SI4 -0.919618 -0.625248
std. error 1.027737 0.329618
prob 0.3747 0.0625
SI5 0.208811 -0.430097
std. error 0.998606 0.315301
prob 0.8351 0.1775
SI6 0.069966 -0.442605
std. error 0.795513 0.309641
prob 0.9302 0.1579
INITIAL INFLATION -0.850038 -0.837299 -0.852239 -0.871272 -0.858784 -0.863955 -0.863851
std. error 0.081579 0.091724 0.091487 0.085408 0.088947 0.086789 0.087213
prob 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
R-Squared 0.785228 0.77401 0.768264 0.774966 0.776059 0.772706 0.77272
DW 1.783751 1.720756 1.750136 1.762017 1.753734 1.738718 1.7528
F-Stat 26.04965 70.783 68.51528 71.17149 71.61972 70.25798 70.26376
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
white heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
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TABLE 6 A; (MODEL (4)) DEPENDENT VARIABLE - TABLE 6 B; (MODEL (4)): DEPENDENT 
GDP GROWTH RATE VOLATILITY VARIABLE - INFLATION VOLATILITY
1 2 3 4
CONSTANT 2.982617 2.952687 3.288993 3.039357 CONSTANT 2.71215
std. error 0.479598 0.591987 0.655698 0.516795 std. error 0.443324
prob 0 0 0 0 prob 0
IT DUMMY -0.90787 -0.603145 -1.505252 -1.848857 IT DUMMY -0.925034
std. error 0.635585 0.48315 0.666283 0.677635 std. error 0.570349
prob 0.1646 0.2212 0.0316 0.0107 prob 0.1103
SI1 1.16402 0.712809 1.153252 SI1 -0.386729
std. error 0.54233 0.503164 0.477711 std. error 0.456093
prob 0.041 0.1672 0.0223 prob 0.4
SI2 0.232631 -0.142833 -0.030414 SI2 1.069022
std. error 0.30295 0.274098 0.246442 std. error 0.540838
prob 0.4492 0.6063 0.9026 prob 0.0529
SI3 1.766038 -0.804806 1.560998 SI4 -1.078497
std. error 1.335101 0.94068 0.988507 std. error 0.735045
prob 0.197 0.3993 0.1251 prob 0.1478
SI4 -2.32071 -1.587669 SI22 0.490358
std. error 1.614362 1.299892 std. error 0.459262
prob 0.1621 0.2311 prob 0.2902
SI5 -2.37545 -2.042837 SI42 -0.117965
std. error 1.277811 1.22442 std. error 0.657956
prob 0.074 0.106 prob 0.8583
SI6 1.926766 1.52307 0.663688 SI52 -0.669637
std. error 1.001011 0.876513 0.895863 std. error 0.755802
prob 0.0648 0.0922 0.4647 prob 0.3793
INITIAL GDP -0.91405 -0.89113 -0.959308 -0.985657 INITIAL INFLATION-0.834374
std. error 0.03901 0.066848 0.048775 0.051152 std. error 0.081436
prob 0 0 0 0 prob 0
R-Squared 0.851433 0.810433 0.81623 0.831169 R-Squared 0.791348
DW 1.741836 1.371855 1.082741 1.170591 DW 1.75189
F-Stat 19.342 33.13258 21.46768 23.79497 F-Stat 27.02281
Observations 36 36 36 36 Observations 66
white heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors white heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors
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